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LOCAL DEMOCRACY ON THE BALLOT 
By Joshua A. Douglas* 
INTRODUCTION 
If all politics is local,1 then all—or at least most—of election law is 
local as well. We do not have one uniform election system but thousands of 
local precincts all running Election Day simultaneously. Local laws play an 
outsized, yet underscrutinized, role in election administration. Every year, 
local jurisdictions change their election rules. Taken together, these laws 
have a significant impact on how we run our democracy. 
The results of the 2016 election show that those interested in election 
law reform must chart a new course forward in a particularly difficult 
political environment. Republicans now control the White House and both 
chambers of Congress. The Republican-controlled Senate recently 
confirmed a conservative, Judge Neil Gorsuch, to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
meaning that conservatives on the Court will likely continue to enjoy a 
majority on voting rights issues for years to come.2 Republican majorities 
control many state legislatures.3 Most governors are Republican as well.4 
Against this backdrop, local election laws represent an untapped area 
for reform, now more vital than ever. As this Essay shows, localities can 
reform the election rules for their own elections. Of course, local laws 
 
* Robert G. Lawson & William H. Fortune Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College 
of Law. Thanks to Mike Pitts, Teddy Rave, Michael Solimine, and Franita Tolson for helpful comments 
on an early draft. I presented this Essay at a faculty workshop at the University of Wisconsin Law 
School and received excellent comments. Grant Sharp provided invaluable research assistance. I greatly 
appreciate the editorial prowess of the Northwestern University Law Review and its editors, especially 
Matt Monahan and Joe Zelasko, whose hard work significantly improved and polished this Essay. 
 1 See Andrew Gelman, All Politics Is Local? The Debate and the Graphs, N.Y. TIMES: 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jan. 3, 2011, 10:35 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/03/all-
politics-is-local-the-debate-and-the-graphs/ [https://perma.cc/69YN-HCRW]. 
 2 See Robert Barnes & Ed O’Keefe, Immediate Impact: Gorsuch Could Begin Playing Pivotal Role 
on Supreme Court Starting Next Week, WASH. POST (Apr. 7, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/immediate-impact-gorsuch-could-redefine-
supreme-court-starting-next-week/2017/04/07/24e6a9cc-1ae9-11e7-9887-1a5314b56a08_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/R9FF-RKCL] (discussing Justice Gorsuch’s “decisive role” in voting rights cases). 
 3  NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2017 STATE & LEGISLATIVE PARTISAN 
COMPOSITION (2017), http://www.ncsl.org/portals/1/documents/elections/Legis_Control_ 2017_
March_27_11am.pdf [https://perma.cc/FX38-93BG] (showing that thirty-two states had Republican-
controlled state legislatures in March 2017). 
 4 Id. (showing that thirty-three states had Republican governors in March 2017). 
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cannot override contrary federal or state laws. Yet there are numerous ways 
localities can alter their own election rules to bring more people into the 
democratic process. Once normalized, these local rules can influence 
federal and state policy. 
This Essay, focusing particularly on voter-backed local election rules, 
proceeds in three parts. Part I highlights how local laws play a significant 
role in dictating voting rights and election rules. Too often election law 
scholars focus solely on federal or state law. But local laws are also 
important in defining the right to vote and providing rules for our 
democracy. New local election law experiments in one place can highlight 
innovative reforms that other cities and states may eventually adopt. This 
avenue to election law reform is particularly important given the current 
political climate. 
Part II considers local ballot initiatives in 2016 regarding election 
laws.5 It highlights the local push to expand voter eligibility, change 
electoral structures, and fix campaign finance rules throughout the country. 
From lowering the voting age for school board elections in Berkeley, 
California, to altering the election rules in Benton County, Oregon, to 
adopting public financing in Howard County, Maryland, voters in cities 
and counties considered various new rules for their elections.6 The rules 
that passed will alter how elections operate in those areas. Part II also 
highlights the need for greater resources—particularly the use of new 
technologies—for local election administrators to implement voting 
reforms. 
Part III argues that courts, when faced with a judicial challenge to one 
of these local laws, should generally defer to local rules that expand the 
electorate or open up the political process to more people, but should not 
defer to local voting restrictions or rules that tend to aggrandize the 
majority’s control. Deference is particularly warranted for voter-backed 
initiatives on local election laws that expand access for voters or candidates 
because the people themselves have ratified those rules. In these instances, 
the majority has given up some of its own power or limited entrenchment 
and incumbent control, which allows more people to become involved in 
the election process.7 From a normative perspective, representative 
 
 5 There were also various state ballot initiatives on election law in 2016. This Essay, however, 
focuses solely on the local ballot initiatives because local laws have generally received scant attention 
from election law scholars. For a discussion of state ballot initiatives on election law, see Daniel A. 
Smith, Direct Democracy and Election and Ethics Laws, in DEMOCRACY IN THE STATES: EXPERIMENTS 
IN ELECTION REFORM 174–85 (Bruce E. Cain et al. eds., 2008). 
 6 See infra Part II. 
 7 See infra Part III. 
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democracy works best with more people participating, either as voters or 
candidates.8 Thus, local laws that enhance democratic participation by 
expanding the electorate or reducing campaign finance barriers to running 
for office epitomize the benefits of local democracy and deserve judicial 
deference. 
Focusing on local election laws represents a long-term solution; 
nationwide reform of our electoral system will not happen overnight. But in 
twenty to thirty years, if local governments have normalized these 
democracy-enhancing efforts and courts have upheld the reforms, then it 
will be easier to enact them on a wider scale. This Essay begins the 
conversation on how to make that happen. 
I. BACKGROUND ON LOCAL ELECTION LAWS 
Federal and state law analysis dominates the study of election law. 
Most scholars focus on Supreme Court doctrine, federal legislation, or 
state-level regulation.9 This emphasis, while important, is underinclusive 
and therefore misses the reality of election law on the ground. Most 
election law implementation happens in cities and counties.10 Moreover, 
given the current political environment, the local level offers the best 
chance at reform in the coming years. We gloss over these local rules at our 
peril. 
Cities and counties play a vital role in running Election Day. They 
administer elections through thousands of county clerks’ offices and 
precincts.11 Many local election offices issue local poll worker guidebooks 
that election officials must follow.12 Often election rules or processes will 
differ significantly among localities. For instance, one county may use a 
different voting machine than the county next door.13 
Some jurisdictions have unique or unusual rules for Election Day. For 
example, Doña Ana County, New Mexico, uses countywide Voting 
Convenience Centers instead of location-specific precincts for voting, so 
 
 8 See infra notes 86–94 and accompanying text. 
 9 See Joshua A. Douglas, State Judges and the Right to Vote, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 11–12 (2016). 
 10 See Justin Weinstein-Tull, A Localist Critique of Shelby County v. Holder, 11 STAN. J. C.R. & 
C.L. 291, 296 (2015) (“Local governments are at the heart of election law because states delegate 
substantial election administration responsibilities to them.”). 
 11 See Joshua A. Douglas, A ‘Checklist Manifesto’ for Election Day: How to Prevent Mistakes at 
the Polls, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 353, 358–59 (2016). 
 12 Id. at 372. 
 13 See, e.g., Chris Wilson, How the Wisconsin Recount Could Help Fix American Elections, TIME 
(Nov. 30, 2016), http://time.com/4583933/wisconsin-recount-election/ [https://perma.cc/ER7B-NS4H] 
(“Elections in Wisconsin are supervised by about 1,850 different municipalities in 72 counties, each of 
which chose their own voting mechanism.”). 
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voters in that county can cast ballots at any Convenience Center in the 
county instead of having to go to their home precinct.14 Two cities in 
Maryland allow sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds to vote in local 
elections.15 Seattle is currently experimenting with campaign finance 
vouchers as a form of public financing, in which the city gives every voter 
four $25 vouchers to donate to any candidate for local office who opts in to 
the program.16 These are just a few examples of innovative local election 
laws that can have a significant effect on local democracy. 
This local activity is important for our democratic processes, 
especially in the current political environment. Given his false rhetoric 
about voter fraud, Donald Trump and his administration may attempt to 
enact nationwide voting laws that make it harder to participate in 
elections.17 At a minimum, a Republican-controlled Congress is unlikely to 
champion issues such as updating the Voting Rights Act or reforming 
campaign finance laws.18 Instead, Congressional Republicans are more 
likely to attempt to cabin the reach of existing pro-voter laws like the 
National Voter Registration Act (the “Motor Voter Law”), which expands 
 
 14 See Voting Convenience Centers, DOÑA ANA COUNTY, https://donaanacounty.org/node/141794 
[https://perma.cc/JJ2F-GSK5] (last visited Apr. 17, 2017); Brian Heaton, Tech Helps End Precinct 
Voting in New Mexico County, GOV’T TECH. (June 27, 2012), http://www.govtech.com/e-
government/Tech-Helps-End-Precinct-Voting-in-New-Mexico-County.html [https://perma.cc/E5FP-
DFRG]. 
 15 See Joshua A. Douglas, In Defense of Lowering the Voting Age, 165 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 63, 
63 (2017), https://www.pennlawreview.com/online/165-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-63.pdf [https://perma.cc/
R3VP-W3AX] (citing Elena Schneider, Students in Maryland Test Civic Participation and Win Right to 
Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/10/us/politics/students-in-maryland-
test-civic-participation-and-win-right-to-vote.html [https://perma.cc/DK9L-9JH2]). 
 16 See Bob Young, ‘Democracy Vouchers’ Win in Seattle; First in Country, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 
4, 2015, 6:20 AM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/democracy-vouchers/ 
[https://perma.cc/D37V-MP6X]; Democracy Voucher Program, SEATTLE.GOV, http://www.seattle.gov/
democracyvoucher/info-for-seattle-residents/faqs#What are Democracy Vouchers? [https://perma.cc/
HMA7-QRLW] (last visited Apr. 17, 2017). 
 17 See Michael Wines, After Bitter Campaign, Election Positions Trump to Shape Rules on How 
You Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/02/us/politics/voting-rights-
donald-trump.html [https://perma.cc/LV4B-ZFV6]; Vanessa Williams & Katie Zezima, Voting Rights 
Advocates Brace for ‘Biggest Fight of Our Lifetime’ During Trump Administration, WASH. POST (Nov. 
30, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/voting-rights-advocates-brace-for-the-biggest-
fight-of-our-lifetime-against-trump-administration/2016/11/29/88bcaee8-b657-11e6-959c-
172c82123976_story.html [https://perma.cc/XE8D-WQJP] (discussing Trump’s claims of widespread 
voter fraud before and after the November 2016 election). 
 18 See generally ARI BERMAN, GIVE US THE BALLOT: THE MODERN STRUGGLE FOR VOTING 
RIGHTS IN AMERICA 183–206 (2015) (documenting the history of the civil rights movement and the 
push for minority voting rights). 
111:173 (2017) Local Democracy on the Ballot 
177 
registration opportunities but, critics claim (without much proof), opens the 
door to voter fraud.19 
Republicans also control most state governments.20 As of 2017, thirty-
three Governors are Republican, and Republicans have majorities in both 
chambers of the legislature in thirty-two states, as compared to full 
Democratic control in only five states.21 Because conventional wisdom 
suggests that expanded access to the franchise benefits Democrats 
politically, Republicans have less incentive to support these measures.22 
Instead, under a mantra of preventing “voter fraud,”23 Republicans are 
likely to promote laws like strict voter ID requirements or other rules that 
make it harder to vote.24 For example, the Republican-controlled Michigan 
legislature debated a strict voter ID requirement during its 2016 lame-duck 
session,25 and New Hampshire Republican Governor Chris Sununu has 
publicly supported the repeal of same-day voter registration in his state.26 It 
seems, then, that many state governments are unlikely to push voter 
expansions and instead may pull back on voting rights in the near future. 
What’s left? Cities and counties. Local election laws provide a way to 
secure grassroots support for electoral reform. Once a locality implements 
an innovative election rule, other jurisdictions can see how it is working. If 
successful, the practice will become normalized. Other places are then 
 
 19 See Mark Joseph Stern, Trump’s Tweet Wasn’t a Distraction. It Was the Start of a Precision 
Assault on Voting Rights, SLATE (Nov. 28, 2016, 1:23 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/
2016/11/28/trump_s_voter_fraud_tweet_part_of_an_assault_on_voting_rights.html 
[https://perma.cc/URS5-7CGZ]. 
 20 See Jennifer G. Hickey, Republicans Build on Their Dominance in State Legislatures, FOX NEWS 
(Nov. 18, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/11/18/republicans-build-on-their-dominance-
in-state-legislatures.html [https://perma.cc/M2WV-ZR42] (“Republicans increased their control in state 
legislatures leaving Democrats with their lowest level since the Civil War.”). 
 21 Id. 
 22 See Ari Berman, Republicans Used to Support Voting Rights—What Happened?, NATION (Apr. 
14, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/democrats-support-voting-rights-republicans-should-too/ 
[perma.cc/B8VY-ZZUF] (highlighting Republicans’ recent move away from supporting expansive 
voting rights). 
 23 See Michael Wines, How Charges of Voter Fraud Became a Political Strategy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/22/us/how-charges-of-voter-fraud-became-a-political-
strategy.html [http://perma.cc/S99L-WB4N]. 
 24 See, e.g., Steven Yaccino & Lizette Alvarez, New G.O.P. Bid to Limit Voting in Swing States, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/30/us/new-gop-bid-to-limit-voting-in-
swing-states.html [http://perma.cc/9TQD-MBBY]. 
 25 See Chad Livengood, Voter ID Bills Surface in Michigan’s Lame-Duck Session, DETROIT NEWS 
(Nov. 30, 2016, 1:58 PM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2016/11/30/voter/
94678424/ [http://perma.cc/FC7A-J8WG]. 
 26 See Rick Ganley & Michael Brindley, Governor-Elect Sununu Says He Wants to End Same-Day 
Voter Registration, N.H. PUB. RADIO (Nov. 18, 2016), http://nhpr.org/post/governor-elect-sununu-says-
he-wants-end-same-day-voter-registration [http://perma.cc/T9ZW-Y4A7]. 
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likely to follow suit. In this way, municipalities can be “test tubes of 
democracy,”27 trying out new election practices that can spread to other 
jurisdictions in the near future. For instance, cities should now watch 
Seattle and evaluate the success of its experiment with using campaign 
vouchers for public financing.28 Seattle is the courageous city that has gone 
first, and if the overall experience is positive, then other cities can use that 
evidence in support of their own similar initiatives. Academics should 
study these reforms to discern which ones work best and deserve 
widespread adoption. 
Many jurisdictions allow voters themselves to approve local measures. 
Seeking to change voting rules at the statewide or national level by 
convincing partisan politicians to revise the very rules under which they 
won their elected position is likely harder than convincing local citizens to 
vote for a proposition that will affect only local elections. Studies show, for 
example, that Americans generally support campaign finance reform.29 But 
entrenched politicians who are winning under the existing system are 
unlikely to alter those rules.30 Success is more likely through a local ballot 
initiative. 
In sum, policymakers and scholars have generally focused on national 
and state election law at the expense of local innovations. But Election Day 
happens on the ground in cities and counties. Many municipalities have 
differing rules for campaigning and voting that deserve scrutiny. More 
significantly, the current political environment demands increased attention 
to local election rules because that is the only area in which proposals 
designed to expand voter access are likely to succeed. The next Part 
considers the 2016 local ballot measures on election rules to assess both 
how they fared and the possibilities for future reform. 
II. LOCAL ELECTION LAW INITIATIVES ON THE 2016 BALLOT 
Voters considered numerous election law measures on local ballots in 
2016. The issues included expanding the right to vote to more individuals, 
 
 27 See Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under Local Law, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 4, 31) (on file with author). 
 28 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 29 See Nicholas Confessore & Megan Thee-Brenan, Poll Shows Americans Favor an Overhaul of 
Campaign Financing, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/03/us/politics/poll-
shows-americans-favor-overhaul-of-campaign-financing.html [http://perma.cc/L8E8-ZHJF]. 
 30 See, e.g., Michael S. Kang, To Here from Theory in Election Law, 87 TEX. L. REV. 787, 790 
(2009) (reviewing HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY OUR ELECTION SYSTEM IS 
FAILING AND HOW TO FIX IT (2009)) (“[E]ntrenchment, usually along . . . partisan lines, freezes out 
election reform and encourages self-serving legislative inertia.”). 
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changing electoral structures and the way elections operate, and reforming 
campaign finance rules. This Part examines these local ballot measures. 
There are two important takeaways. First, categorizing local election 
law initiatives helps us to understand what areas voters on the ground think 
need reform. That is, having a systematic comprehension of where 
grassroots activity already exists will inform the debate moving forward 
and help advocates determine where to look next. Second, examining these 
local initiatives makes it clear that we desperately need better resources, 
such as enhanced voting technology, to improve our election system. If 
nothing else, then, this discussion of local election rules should create a call 
to action to policymakers at all levels to dedicate greater resources to 
electoral innovations. 
A. Local Election Law Reform: 2016 Results 
Numerous local election law ballot initiatives popped up across the 
country in 2016. They fell into three categories: efforts to expand the 
electorate, proposals to change electoral structures, and attempts at 
campaign finance reform. Most measures passed. 
First, advocates in the Bay Area sought to expand the electorate for 
certain local elections by lowering the voting age to sixteen or allowing 
noncitizens to vote in specific local races. These actions follow similar 
measures previously enacted in a few Maryland municipalities.31 In 
Berkeley, California, voters overwhelmingly passed Measure Y1, which 
allows sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds to vote for members of the school 
board.32 Similarly, San Francisco voters enacted Proposition N, which 
allows noncitizens to vote in school board elections.33 But San Francisco 
voters narrowly rejected Proposition F, which would have lowered the 
voting age to sixteen for all city elections, with about 52.1% voting against 
 
 31 See Douglas, supra note 15, at 63; Douglas, supra note 27 (manuscript at 12–15). 
 32 Berkeley, California, School Director Election Youth Voting, Measure Y1 (November 2016), 
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Berkeley,_California,_School_Director_Election_Youth_Voting, 
_Measure_Y1_(November_2016) [http://perma.cc/325T-JG22] (last visited Apr. 18, 2017) (showing 
that over 70% of voters approved the measure). 
 33 See Rong-Gong Lin II, San Francisco Measure to Allow Noncitizen Parents to Vote in School 
Board Elections Leading, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2016, 4:02 AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/
politics/trailguide/la-na-election-aftermath-updates-trail-san-francisco-measure-to-allow-1478692962-
htmlstory.html [http://perma.cc/27C5-TF2B]; San Francisco, California, Non-Citizen Voting in School 
Board Elections Amendment, Proposition N (November 2016), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/
San_Francisco,_California,_Non-Citizen_Voting_in_School_Board_Elections_Amendment,_
Proposition_N_(November_2016) [http://perma.cc/PD4Z-CTP4] (last visited Apr. 18, 2017) (showing 
that the measure passed with over 54% of the vote). 
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the proposition to 47.9% voting for it.34 Given this fairly close result, 
advocates are likely to put the measure on the ballot again in 2020.35 
Second, there were numerous local ballot measures concerning 
electoral structures that will change the way future elections are run. 
Perhaps among the most innovative was Benton County, Oregon’s 
adoption of ranked choice voting.36 In this new electoral system, voters will 
rank their preferences among as many candidates as they wish, instead of 
just voting for one person per office.37 If a candidate does not receive at 
least 50% of all first choice votes, then the candidate with the fewest first 
choice votes is eliminated, and voters who selected that candidate have 
their second choice vote counted instead.38 The process is repeated until 
there is a candidate with at least 50%.39 Supporters note that this system 
will ensure that voters will not feel like they are wasting their vote, as they 
might in the normal system if they vote for someone who has little shot of 
winning, such as a third-party candidate.40 Maine also passed ranked choice 
voting in 2016 for its statewide elections.41 
Another structural election change that voters in two cities passed is 
moving Election Day for local races to November instead of earlier in the 
year. Using this date will align local elections with federal and state 
 
 34 See Michael Barba, Youth Voting Measure Fails, S.F. EXAMINER (Nov. 9, 2016), 
http://www.sfexaminer.com/youth-voting-measure-fails/ [http://perma.cc/VT86-KZZ2]; San Francisco, 
California, Local Elections Voting Age Reduction Amendment, Proposition F (November 2016), 
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/San_Francisco,_California,_Local_Elections_Voting_Age_
Reduction_Amendment,_Proposition_F_(November_2016) [http://perma.cc/G6KU-NUT9] (last visited 
Apr. 18, 2017). 
 35 See Press Release, Brandon Klugman, Vote16 USA, Historic Measure Almost Passes: More than 
172,000 Vote to Extend Voting Rights to 16-Year-Olds for Municipal Elections (Nov. 28, 2016), 
http://vote16usa.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Prop-F-Final-Press-Release-11.28.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/UBS4-L6LS] (expressing commitment to continue campaigning for a lower voting 
age). 
 36 See Press Release, Blair Bobier, FairVote, Benton County Passes Ranked Choice Voting (Nov. 
9, 2016), http://www.fairvote.org/benton_county_passes_ranked_choice_voting [http://perma.cc/
WMY2-78V4]. 
 37 See Ranked Choice Voting/Instant Runoff, FAIRVOTE, http://www.fairvote.org/
rcv#how_rcv_works [https://perma.cc/7PYX-FPNY] (last visited Apr. 18, 2017). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 See Bennett Hall, Ranked Choice Measure Passes, CORVALLIS GAZETTE-TIMES (Nov. 8, 2016), 
http://www.gazettetimes.com/news/local/ranked-choice-measure-passes/article_621d78e7-a851-5156-
a2c0-bbc2582b00d6.html [https://perma.cc/G57R-BPTZ]. 
 41 See Nik DeCosta-Klipa, Maine Became the First State in the Country Tuesday to Pass Ranked 
Choice Voting, BOSTON.COM (Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.boston.com/news/politics/2016/11/10/
maine-became-the-first-state-in-the-country-to-pass-ranked-choice-voting [https://perma.cc/7VM6-
8CBJ]. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine issued an advisory opinion saying that the law would 
violate the state constitution. Opinion of the Justices, No. OJ–17–1, 2017 WL 2240802 (Me. May 23, 
2017).  
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elections, instead of the current practice of having a separate Election Day 
for local offices.42 Voters in Hayward, California,43 and Jersey City, New 
Jersey,44 will now use the November general election date for their own 
local elections. In addition, San Diego voters passed a proposition that 
requires citizens’ initiatives and veto referenda to appear on the November 
general election ballot instead of the June primary.45 These measures will 
likely increase turnout in local elections and cost less, as the jurisdictions 
will not need to run a separate Election Day for local races.46 It may also 
improve turnout among minority voters.47 
Voters in several places empowered independent redistricting 
commissions to take over the line-drawing process for local jurisdictions, 
instead of relying on elected officials to draw the maps. The measures to 
create independent redistricting commissions passed in Berkeley48 and 
 
 42 See infra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 43 See Hayward, California, Charter Amendment to Move City General Elections to November, 
Measure C (June 2016), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Hayward,_California,_Charter_
Amendment_to_Move_City_General_Elections_to_November,_Measure_C_(June_2016) 
[https://perma.cc/JMU4-BH7H] (last visited Apr. 18, 2017). 
 44 See Jersey City, New Jersey, Election Date Change Measure (November 2016), BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Jersey_City,_New_Jersey,_Election_Date_Change_Measure_(November_2016) 
[https://perma.cc/Q66Q-LCKB] (last visited Apr. 18, 2017). 
 45 See San Diego, California, Citizens’ Initiatives on the General Election Ballot, Measure L 
(November 2016), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/San_Diego,_California,_
Citizens%E2%80%99_Initiatives_on_the_General_Election_Ballot,_Measure_L_(November_2016) 
[https://perma.cc/4EKC-JBHA] (last visited Apr. 18, 2017) (allowing for exceptions if the City Council 
decides to submit the measure to voters earlier than the next November election). 
 46 See, e.g., Election Dates May or May Not Matter, CANVASS (Nat’l Conference of State 
Legislatures, Washington, D.C.), Apr. 2016 at 1–2, 
http://www.ncsl.org/Documents/Elections/The_Canvass_April_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3Q8-
G7QJ] (“When local elections are moved to the same day as state and national elections, voter turnout 
in the local races increases dramatically.” (quoting Sarah Anzia, author of a book on off-year 
elections)); id. at 3 (noting that cost “savings come from running two elections versus only one”); 
Zoltan L. Hajnal & Paul G. Lewis, Municipal Institutions and Voter Turnout in Local Elections, 
38 URB. AFF. REV. 645, 661 (2003) (“Holding city elections on the same day as national or statewide 
contests could essentially double voter turnout over existing rates in off-cycle city elections.”); Mike 
Maciag, Voter Turnout Plummeting in Local Elections, GOVERNING (Oct. 2014), 
http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/gov-voter-turnout-municipal-elections.html 
[https://perma.cc/3A7F-8W6P] (discussing effects on turnout and cost of moving local elections to 
coincide with state and federal elections). 
 47 See, e.g., Spencer Overton, Voting Rights Disclosure, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 19, 26 (2013) 
(noting that “[i]n 2010, African Americans in Augusta-Richmond, Georgia, made up a much larger 
percentage of the electorate in elections held in November (52 percent) than in elections held in July (43 
percent)”). See generally Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party?: How Courts Should Think About 
Republican Efforts to Make It Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 
58, 58–61 (2014) (recounting Jim Crow history of North Carolina where majority white Democrats 
moved Election Day from November to August to disenfranchise African-Americans). 
 48 See Berkeley, California, City Council Redistricting Charter Amendment, Measure W1 
(November 2016), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Berkeley,_California,_City_Council_
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Sacramento, California,49 as did a similar measure to create an advisory 
redistricting commission in Stockton, California.50 This activity is 
significant because elected officials themselves are less likely to enact this 
reform given that it reduces their own power.51 These local ballot measures 
thus represent the voters literally taking election law issues away from 
politicians and placing them in the hands of citizens who will not have the 
same level of self-interest. 
Term limits were also an issue in several local elections in 2016. In 
April 2016, Walnut, California voters approved term limits for their city 
council.52 Voters in Sweetwater Union High School District, California, 
enacted a two-term limit for school board members.53 Similarly, Carroll 
County, Maryland voters approved a two-term limit for their Board of 
Education.54 And Montgomery County, Maryland voters imposed a three-
 
Redistricting_Charter_Amendment,_Measure_W1_(November_2016) [https://perma.cc/UM3F-2TZ2] 
(last visited Apr. 17, 2017). 
 49 See City of Sacramento, California, Independent Redistricting Commission, Measure L 
(November 2016), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/City_of_Sacramento,_California,_ 
Independent_Redistricting_Commission,_Measure_L_(November_2016) [https://perma.cc/ZX4E-
W9PN] (last visited Apr. 17, 2017). In addition, earlier in 2016, San Diego voters approved procedural 
amendments for its existing independent redistricting commission. See San Diego, California, City 
Council Redistricting Commission and Process Amendments, Proposition A (June 2016), 
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/San_Diego,_California,_City_Council_Redistricting_
Commission_and_Process_Amendments,_Proposition_A_(June_2016) [https://perma.cc/N7JC-JPYP] 
(last visited Apr. 17, 2017). 
 50 See Stockton, California, City Council Redistricting Commission, By-District Elections, and 
Term Limits Amendment, Measure N (November 2016), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/
Stockton,_California,_City_Council_Redistricting_Commission,_By-District_Elections,_and_Term_
Limits_Amendment,_Measure_N_(November_2016) [https://perma.cc/GHC8-QKH6] (last visited Apr. 
17, 2017). 
 51 See Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting: Why Popular Initiatives to Establish 
Redistricting Commissions Succeed or Fail, 23 J.L. & POL. 331, 332 (2007) (“[L]egislators are the 
primary beneficiaries of the redistricting status quo, and therefore have a strong incentive not to change 
the rules that allow them to be reelected time after time. . . . Legislators’ self-interest and adverse court 
decisions leave critics of contemporary redistricting with only one promising avenue for reform: the 
popular initiative.”). 
 52 See Steve Scauzillo, Election 2016: Walnut Voters Supporting City Term-Limit Measure, SAN 
GABRIEL VALLEY TR. (Apr. 12, 2016, 9:09 PM), http://www.sgvtribune.com/government-and-
politics/20160412/election-2016-walnut-voters-supporting-city-term-limit-measure [https://perma.cc/
4LNC-5D7W]; Walnut, California, City Council Term Limits, Measure A (April 2016), BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Walnut,_California,_City_Council_Term_Limits,_Measure_A_(April_2016) 
[https://perma.cc/VTL6-BN65] (last visited Apr. 18, 2017). 
 53 See Sweetwater Union High School District, California, Board of Trustees Term Limits, Measure 
CC (November 2016), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Sweetwater_Union_High_School_
District,_California,_Board_of_Trustees_Term_Limits,_Measure_CC_(November_2016) 
[https://perma.cc/CB9W-YFGH] (last visited Apr. 17, 2017). 
 54 See Pamela Wood, Voters Deciding Public Finance for Howard County Elections, Term Limits 
for Carroll School Board, BALTIMORE SUN (Nov. 9, 2016, 4:47 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/
news/maryland/bs-md-county-questions-20161108-story.html [https://perma.cc/4VFB-96W9]. 
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term limit for the county executive and members of the county council.55 
These measures help to open up the electoral process to outsiders by 
limiting how many times incumbents may run for reelection.56 
Finally, voters in several jurisdictions enacted campaign finance 
reforms for local elections. Voters in Multnomah County, Oregon, passed a 
broad “honest elections” measure that includes limits on contributions to 
candidates and stronger disclosure requirements.57 Under the new rules, 
individual contributions to a candidate are limited to $500, and political 
advertisements related to local elections must disclose the real identities of 
the ad’s top five funders.58 The ballot measure was intended to spark a legal 
challenge in an effort to overturn both U.S. Supreme Court and Oregon 
Supreme Court precedent.59 In June 2016, voters in Orange County, 
California, enacted a measure to create a campaign finance and ethics 
commission.60 San Francisco voters overwhelmingly approved a 
proposition that prohibits lobbyists from making campaign contributions to 
elected city officials.61 And Howard County, Maryland voters enacted a 
public financing scheme for local elections.62 
Reviewing the numerous ballot initiatives in 2016 on local election 
laws provides a few takeaways. A significant number of the proposals on 
local voting rules passed.63 Voters were mostly concerned with expanding 
 
 55 See Deb Belt, 2016 Election Results: Montgomery County Voters Approve Council Term Limits, 
ROCKVILLE PATCH (Nov. 9, 2016, 10:58 AM), http://patch.com/maryland/rockville/2016-election-
results-montgomery-county-voters-approve-council-term-limits [https://perma.cc/V83S-V9F2]. 
 56 See generally Einer Elhauge, Are Term Limits Undemocratic?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 83, 87–88 
(1997) (discussing various benefits and disadvantages of term limits from democratic and policy 
perspectives). 
 57 See MULTNOMAH COUNTY HONEST ELECTIONS, http://mult.honest-elections.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/9QHZ-YNWW] (last visited Apr. 17, 2017). 
 58 See id. 
 59 See Nick Budnick, Multnomah Commissioners Flip After Backlash on Campaign Finance 
Reform, PORTLAND TRIB. (Apr. 14, 2017), http://portlandtribune.com/pt/9-news/354431-234257-
multnomah-commissioners-flip-after-backlash-on-campaign-finance-reform [https://perma.cc/96T5-
C6E2]. 
 60 See Orange County, California, Ethics Commission Establishment, Measure A (June 2016), 
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Orange_County,_California,_Ethics_Commision_
Establishment,_Measure_A_(June_2016) [https://perma.cc/TW9J-Y48J] (last visited Apr. 17, 2017). 
 61 See San Francisco, California, Restrictions on Gifts and Campaign Contributions from 
Lobbyists, Proposition T (November 2016), BALLOTPEDIA https://ballotpedia.org/San_Francisco,_
California,_Restrictions_on_Gifts_and_Campaign_Contributions_from_Lobbyists,_Proposition_T_ 
(November_2016) [https://perma.cc/WCU2-WUJL] (last visited Apr. 18, 2017). 
 62 See Wood, supra note 54. 
 63 In conducting this research, I studied every local initiative on election law listed on Ballotpedia 
for 2016 and searched Google for news stories on other measures. The only ones that failed were San 
Francisco’s proposal to lower the voting age to sixteen, see supra note 34; pushes to change the 
structure of elections from at large to by-district such as in Columbus, Ohio, see Lucas Sullivan, 
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the electorate, changing electoral structures, and pushing back on large 
amounts of money infiltrating local elections. Yet the activity so far has 
been limited to a few geographic areas: cities and counties in California, 
Maryland, and Oregon. That said, communities in other states also 
considered various measures, such as initiatives in Columbus, Ohio,64 and 
Laredo, Texas,65 to change the size of the city council, which failed in both 
cities. Given that most municipalities have the initiative or referenda 
power, local voter-backed measures can significantly improve the 
democratic process.66 More localities should invoke this power to enact 
positive election law reform. The examples in California, Maryland, and 
Oregon present models for other communities to consider. They also point 
to some technical challenges advocates must overcome, as discussed next. 
B. Need for Better Election Resources 
Many of the reforms discussed above cost money. Expanding the 
electorate requires both voting technology that can handle new voters for 
only specific local races and educational outreach to these new voters. 
Changing the electoral structure takes resources for implementation. 
Campaign finance reform also relies on expenditures, such as a pool of 
money to fund ethics commissions or public financing. This section details 
the specific resources necessary for each kind of local election reform. The 
key point is that to achieve success with local voting rules, cities, states, 
and the federal government should allocate significant resources to improve 
the democratic process. This investment, even at the local level, can have a 
large impact: not only do local jurisdictions administer local, state, and 
federal elections, but positive innovations in one city can trickle across to 
other cities and eventually up to state and national policy.67 That is, 
 
Council Ward Issue Destroyed at Polls: 72 Percent of Voters Say No, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Aug. 3, 
2016, 11:32 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2016/08/02/issue-one.html 
[https://perma.cc/LSF2-R9WA]; and several efforts to make particular offices elected instead of 
appointed, or vice versa, in California, see, e.g., Antioch, California, Appointed Treasurer Proposal, 
Measure G (June 2016), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Antioch,_California,_Appointed_
Treasurer_Proposal,_Measure_G_(June_2016) [https://perma.cc/5TMU-JTWQ] (last visited Apr. 17, 
2017). Although it is possible that this research did not catch every ballot initiative on local election law 
in 2016, voters passed the majority of the ones I uncovered. 
 64 See Sullivan, supra note 63. 
 65 See Event Filled 2016 Ends, LAREDO MORNING TIMES ONLINE (Dec. 31, 2016, 3:36 AM), 
http://www.lmtonline.com/news/article/Event-filled-2016-ends-10828183.php [https://perma.cc/8B96-
GUSP] (noting the defeat of the proposition). 
 66 See Robert D. Cooter & Michael D. Gilbert, A Theory of Direct Democracy and the Single 
Subject Rule, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 695 (2010) (“At the local level, over half of all American cities, 
covering about seventy percent of the national population, are estimated to have an initiative process. 
Nearly all American cities have the referendum.” (footnote omitted)). 
 67 See Douglas, supra note 27 (manuscript at 3–4, 23). 
111:173 (2017) Local Democracy on the Ballot 
185 
focusing our resources on local voting reforms will have an outsized effect 
on all elections. 
First, expanding the electorate only for local elections (or a subset, 
like school board elections) requires voting machines or other mechanisms 
to allow these individuals to vote for local races but not for other offices. 
For instance, San Francisco and Berkeley both expanded their electorates 
for school board elections: legal noncitizens in San Francisco and those 
aged sixteen and seventeen in Berkeley may now vote for school board 
members.68 Yet these elections occur at the same time as many other 
elections for which noncitizens or sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds are 
ineligible. Thus, the cities need a system that allows certain voters to 
participate in only specific elections that occur at the same time as other 
elections.69 This is not a difficult task, but it requires the proper resources, 
such as computerized voter rolls and updated voting equipment. 
Second, sufficient resources are needed to implement how our 
elections operate. For instance, adopting ranked choice voting for elections 
in Benton County, Oregon, requires both updated voting equipment and 
public education.70 Moving Election Day for local offices to November to 
coincide with federal and state elections will require an initial outlay of 
money, such as to design and print longer ballots, but the change will save 
resources in the long run.71 Similarly, independent redistricting 
commissions require money and other resources to do their jobs effectively, 
such as the sophisticated software needed to draw maps that comply with 
all relevant laws.72 
Finally, local campaign finance reform, ironically, requires money. 
Local jurisdictions that create ethics and oversight commissions need 
resources to ensure that these bodies are effective. Public financing requires 
enough money for candidates to opt in to the system.73 For example, 
Seattle’s Democracy Vouchers program, which provides each voter in the 
city with four $25 vouchers to allocate among candidates for local office 
 
 68 See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. 
 69 See Douglas, supra note 27 (manuscript at 61). 
 70 See Hall, supra note 40 (noting that to implement ranked choice voting in the county, “the voting 
method and equipment will have to be certified by the Oregon Secretary of State’s Office, and that will 
cost money”). 
 71 See Maciag, supra note 46; Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 46, at 3. 
 72 See, e.g., Angelo N. Ancheta, Redistricting Reform and the California Citizens Redistricting 
Commission, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 109, 118–19, 130 (2014) (discussing costs of California’s 2010 
redistricting cycle, which used an independent commission comprised of California residents). 
 73 Russell Berman, Seattle’s Experiment with Campaign Financing, ATLANTIC (Nov. 10, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/seattle-experiments-with-campaign-funding/
415026/ [https://perma.cc/D3MG-HLWV] (discussing the requirements for candidates who opt in to the 
program). 
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who agree to various campaign finance limitations, will rely on money 
from the public fisc to fund these vouchers.74 
These hurdles are not insurmountable. They simply require 
recognition and action: we do not invest enough in our elections, and yet 
we should, especially if we want to improve the process in the way these 
cities are contemplating. The fact that these changes require money and 
other resources is not a reason to reject them. On the contrary, investments 
in local elections will have corresponding benefits on state and federal 
elections. Moreover, many local jurisdictions fund their own election 
systems, meaning that they can enact these reforms without federal or state 
assistance (although additional funds will certainly help).75 Recognizing the 
resources required to implement these actions is an important part of the 
discussion. The likely benefits of local election reform should serve as a 
call to local and state politicians to allocate sufficient funds for the proper 
operation of our democracy. 
III. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO LOCAL ELECTION LAW INITIATIVES 
The final question is how courts should handle the inevitable legal 
challenges that opponents will bring against local election law innovations. 
Election litigation has become “a routine part of campaign strategy.”76 
Surely new local election law rules will not be immune to this 
phenomenon. Opponents of these local measures will likely argue (1) that 
state law preempts the local laws or (2) that state home rule doctrine does 
not give localities the authority to enact their own election rules.77 Courts 
therefore need tools for addressing these arguments. 
In another article, I laid down some general precepts for handling 
challenges to local election laws: courts should defer to laws that expand 
voting access but scrutinize more carefully laws that have the primary 
purpose or effect of making it harder to vote.78 Here, I extrapolate from that 
 
 74 Id. (noting that the city plans to pay the $3 million cost of the program by raising property taxes). 
 75 See Weinstein-Tull, supra note 10, at 297 (noting that local governments pay the bulk of election 
costs in most states). 
 76 See Joshua A. Douglas, Discouraging Election Contests, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1015, 1015 (2013). 
 77 See Douglas, supra note 27 (manuscript at 4–5). There also could be a challenge to a new local 
rule under the federal Equal Protection Clause or another federal provision such as the Voting Rights 
Act, especially if the law restricts the right to vote. Federal election law jurisprudence is fairly well 
developed. See Joshua A. Douglas, (Mis)trusting States to Run Elections, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 553, 
558 (2015) [hereinafter (Mis)trusting States]. Although courts are likely to use this traditional election 
law analysis for a federal challenge, the approach discussed above also can help courts discern the 
proper level of scrutiny to apply under current Supreme Court doctrine. 
 78 See Douglas, supra note 27 (manuscript at 5). 
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test to provide guidelines specifically for local election law initiatives 
passed by the voters themselves. 
The Supreme Court has waffled between strict and light-touch judicial 
review of laws enacted through ballot initiatives or referenda, collectively 
known as direct democracy.79 Scholars, too, have differed in advocating 
between more or less deference to voter-enacted laws. For example, over 
twenty-five years ago, Professor Julian Eule argued that courts should take 
“a harder look when constitutional challenges are mounted against laws 
enacted by substitutive plebiscite.”80 According to Professor Eule, direct 
democracy can serve as a tool for unwarranted majoritarian control: 
“Where the structure itself is unable to guarantee a hearing for a variety of 
voices or to prevent factional domination, courts must pick up the slack and 
ensure that the majority governs in the interests of the whole people.”81 By 
contrast, Professor Michael Solimine, agreeing with a recent Justice 
Thomas dissent,82 argues that a “hard look” at laws passed through direct 
democracy is unwarranted because the process and product of voter-backed 
initiatives is not that different from legislative enactments.83 Instead, 
according to Professor Solimine, courts should treat any kind of law, 
passed by a legislature or the people themselves, the same way.84 Professor 
Teddy Rave argues for “rational-basis-with-bite” under a theory that ballot 
initiative voters owe some measure of duty to the general public, so courts 
must police “opportunism” by the majority.85 Other scholars have generally 
fallen somewhere within this spectrum, with most aligning themselves with 
Professor Eule’s hard look analysis.86 
These standards, however, generally do not consider the underlying 
substance of the ballot initiative at issue, instead seeking a one-size-fits-all 
 
 79 See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2697–99 
(2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 80 Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1558 (1990). 
 81 Id. at 1559. 
 82 Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2697 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 83 See Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy: A Reappraisal, 104 KY. L.J. 
671, 672–74, 697 (2016) (“I think Justice Thomas has it right that constitutional challenges to the 
products of direct democracy in federal court should be subject to the same scrutiny as legislative and 
executive action.”). 
 84 Id. at 697. Importantly, Professor Solimine notes that his analysis applies only to federal court 
review of state initiatives. Id. at 674 n.15. State court review, and any review of local voter-backed 
enactments, is outside the scope of his argument. It is not clear whether he would adopt the same test to 
federal or state court review of local election law initiatives, the subject of my inquiry. 
 85 See D. Theodore Rave, Fiduciary Voters?, 66 DUKE L.J. 331, 374 (2016). 
 86 See Solimine, supra note 83, at 680 n.60. 
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approach to judicial review of the products of direct democracy.87 But 
where it comes to the very rules under which we hold our elections, the 
substance of the new law—and in particular whether it expands or restricts 
the opportunity to participate in our democracy—is vitally important. 
Courts should defer to voter-backed initiatives that expand the 
electorate, improve the voting system, or open up the process to more 
candidates. These rules do not pose the risk of majoritarian opportunism, 
but instead are efforts by voters to increase the political power of others or 
to reform the democratic process to better reflect the overall views of the 
electorate. By contrast, courts should not defer to laws that restrict voter or 
candidate access, which often represent the majority’s efforts to exclude 
minority factions from the political process in an attempt to aggrandize 
power or entrench itself. 
When voters adopt a rule that includes more people in the electorate, 
they are typically diluting their own influence in the process. The addition 
of more people to the voter rolls necessarily means that prior individual 
voters will make up a smaller percentage of the electorate, such that each 
person’s vote is worth slightly less. Thus, laws that expand the electorate, 
such as for noncitizens or young individuals, necessarily represent the 
majority’s view that including more people in the electorate is worth the 
resulting loss in the value of their own vote. The majority is reducing its 
own comparative power based on its belief in enhancing democratic 
representation for others. Even if the majority chooses to include more 
people in the electorate because it believes these new voters will align 
politically with the governing class and will make that majority stronger, 
the result is still an expansion of democracy for these new individuals. That 
is, democratic expansion is a normative good, irrespective of the political 
motivations or ramifications. 
A court deciding a judicial challenge to a local expansion of the 
electorate should recognize that the law is an attempt to enhance 
democratic participation. Increasing voter engagement warrants judicial 
deference. As Professor Rick Hasen has explained, courts should adopt a 
“Democracy Canon” in which judges hold “a thumb on the scale in favor of 
voter enfranchisement.”88 The fact that the voters themselves have passed 
this voter enfranchisement, at the expense of their own relative individual 
power, counsels even more strongly in favor of a democracy canon for 
local election rules. 
 
 87 Professor Eule does recognize that a hard look is not as necessary when “the electorate acts to 
improve the processes of legislative representation . . . .” Eule, supra note 80, at 1559. 
 88 See Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69, 71 (2009) (emphasis 
removed). 
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Similarly, laws that make the election process more competitive, at the 
expense of incumbents or entrenched majorities, are democracy-enhancing 
and warrant judicial deference. The creation of independent redistricting 
commissions takes power away from incumbent politicians, who have an 
incentive to draw district lines that favor their own candidacies or help their 
political party.89 Term limits open up opportunities for more individuals to 
run for office. Campaign finance reforms, such as ethics commissions or 
public financing, generally favor nonwealthy or less-connected outsiders. 
Ethics commissions theoretically help to root out corruption among 
political elites and rich donors,90 while public financing makes it easier for 
nonwealthy candidates to have sufficient resources to run for office.91 All of 
these measures seek to open the process to more people and make elections 
more competitive. They provide a “safety valve” against “self-dealing” 
representatives.92 To use Professor Eule’s language, there is no longer a 
need for a “harder look” at these measures because they “pose no 
distinctive threat of majoritarian tyranny. These measures install new filters 
rather than seeking to bypass the existing ones.”93 
Courts should construe these democracy-enhancing laws in a manner 
that recognizes the unique nature of voter-approved electoral reforms. 
These rules make elections more competitive and open opportunities for 
more people to participate. Put another way, direct democracy voters are 
“representative legislators who must vote in the public interest and must 
not vote in their private interests.”94 Choosing to include more people in the 
electorate or reforming the election apparatus to increase competitiveness 
and reduce incumbency protection serves the public interest in democracy 
at the expense of a voter’s or incumbent’s own private interest.95 Courts 
should therefore defer to local election law initiatives that put the public 
 
 89 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 51, at 332. 
 90 But see Kayla Crider & Jeffrey Milyo, Do State Ethics Commissions Reduce Political 
Corruption? An Exploratory Investigation, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 717, 718, 732 (2013) (noting the rise 
in state ethics commissions after political scandals but finding that ethics commissions generally do not 
actually reduce political corruption). 
 91 See Mimi Murray, Digby Marziani & Adam Skaggs, More than Combating Corruption: The 
Other Benefits of Public Financing, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Oct. 7, 2011), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/more-combating-corruption-other-benefits-public-financing 
[https://perma.cc/7T5T-KGWR] (discussing empirical studies that show that public financing promotes 
more competitive elections). 
 92 See Rave, supra note 85, at 375, 377–78 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison)). 
 93 Eule, supra note 80, at 1559–60. 
 94 Michael Serota & Ethan J. Leib, The Political Morality of Voting in Direct Democracy, 
97 MINN. L. REV. 1596, 1596 (2013). 
 95 See id. at 1598 (“The most basic and foundational obligation [of a direct democracy voter] is that 
the representative must vote in the pursuit of a credible and good faith conception of the public interest, 
rather than her private interests.”). 
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interest above individual voters’ private interests, so long as the law does 
not directly violate an explicit constitutional or statutory requirement. 
Further, from a policy perspective, judicial deference to local voting 
expansions fits the broader principles of federalism. As local governments 
pass these reforms, they can serve as models for other places, both within 
the state and across the country. As I discuss in other work, municipalities 
can serve as “test tubes of democracy,” experimenting with local election 
rules.96 The best ones will “trickle across” to other cities and eventually 
“trickle up” to state and national policy.97 Courts should generally allow 
election law innovations that expand the electorate or make elections more 
competitive, unless they run squarely into a federal or state law or 
regulation that explicitly contradicts these new rules. 
Courts ought to encourage localities to experiment with democracy-
enhancing election rules; judges should not stand in the way by imposing 
too-stringent judicial review. As Professor Richard Briffault explains:  
[A] number of cities and counties across the country have been actively 
engaged in examining and revising their local governmental and electoral 
processes, and in experimenting with new forms of political 
organization. . . . [T]hese developments nicely illustrate both the capacity of 
local governments to restructure basic features of their political organization, 
and their interest in doing so.98  
Localities are well suited to make these kinds of changes through 
voter initiatives given the smaller size of the electorate and the values 
inherent in federalism.99 
For the same reason that courts should defer to local laws that are 
democracy-enhancing, however, courts should not defer to local initiatives 
that restrict the electorate, create electoral structures that protect 
incumbents, or make it harder for people to run as candidates. A law that 
has the effect of disenfranchisement enhances the relative power of the 
voters who support the law at the expense of those disenfranchised. 
Similarly, a law that protects incumbents benefits the incumbents 
themselves, making it harder to defeat them even if they fall out of favor 
 
 96 See Douglas, supra note 27 (manuscript at 3). 
 97 Id. (manuscript at 4). 
 98 Richard Briffault, Home Rule and Local Political Innovation, 22 J.L. & POL. 1, 2–3 (2006). 
 99 See Matthew J. Parlow, Progressive Policy-Making on the Local Level: Rethinking Traditional 
Notions of Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 371, 371, 374 (2008) (noting that “local 
governments may prove even more fruitful agents for social change and policy innovation than the state 
or federal levels of government” (footnote omitted)). 
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with voters.100 That kind of action is fundamentally antidemocratic. As 
Professor Rave notes, “Direct democracy is ripe for minority exploitation 
because it lacks many of the structural protections for minorities that are 
built into a representative democracy.”101 Courts should therefore give a 
“harder look” to measures that limit participation or competitiveness.102 
This approach aligns well with Supreme Court jurisprudence on direct 
democracy. In reviewing voter-enacted laws, the Court seems focused 
mostly on “policing for minority exploitation and acting as an equitable 
brake on majoritarian excess where the structural protections for the 
minority are weakest.”103 Election laws that aggrandize the majority’s 
control by making it harder to vote or by placing barriers to entry for 
candidates epitomize the concern of minority exploitation and 
“opportunism.”104 To use a real-world example, a court would be wise to 
look more skeptically at a local law extending a mayor’s term from two to 
four years, as a longer term could represent a form of entrenchment of the 
ruling politician or his or her party because voters will have to wait longer 
for a chance to vote the incumbent out.105 A hard look does not mean that a 
court will necessarily invalidate the law, as the voters may have had strong 
reasons, from the perspective of good government, to support this change. 
Heightened scrutiny simply provides less deference than the court would 
normally give to a law that expands the franchise or opens opportunities for 
outsider candidates. The government will have to provide stronger 
justifications for a new rule that is not democracy-enhancing. 
Thus, judicial review of local ballot initiatives on election law should 
take a two-track path: if the new law is democracy-enhancing by expanding 
voter or candidate participation, then courts should generally defer to the 
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local electorate’s preferences on how to run its own elections. However, if 
a new law leads to disenfranchisement or incumbency protection such that 
the majority may be creating rules to aggrandize its own power, then the 
court should employ more stringent judicial review. 
This formulation means that courts will be tasked with the initial 
assessment of whether a new law is democracy-enhancing or restricting. At 
the margins, this might be a difficult question. Some laws, such as a change 
to an electoral structure, might have both democracy-enhancing and 
democracy-restricting components for different groups of voters.106 But we 
can trust courts to discern the main import of local election laws using 
traditional tools of judicial analysis. The key question will be whether the 
law has the primary purpose or effect of opening the democratic process to 
more people or instead shutting certain people out. The litigants can bring 
experts on election law and political science to demonstrate the primary 
purpose or effect of a law, much like they do already in Voting Rights Act 
litigation.107 Moreover, there can be a sliding scale for the amount of 
deference a court will give: the more factors that point to a democracy-
enhancing rule, the more deference the court should provide to the new 
law, and vice versa. 
The level of deference goes to the interpretation of state law as 
compared to the new local rule. Recall that a judicial challenge will likely 
derive from an argument that state law either preempts a local election rule 
or does not give localities the authority to enact specific laws for their own 
elections.108 Where there is room for interpretation, courts should read the 
state law as not interfering with local rules if the local law is democracy-
enhancing, but more strictly construe the state law as preempting local 
measures if the law is democracy-restricting. Given that federal and state 
constitutions and laws generally provide a floor for voting rights 
protections, most local measures necessarily will be democracy-enhancing, 
setting rules for local elections that are more expansive than state laws. 
Laws that promote greater participation do not require a “hard judicial 
look.”109 Indeed, most of the measures on the 2016 ballot that passed local 
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constituencies opened the process for voters or made it easier for 
candidates to run for office.110 
Deference also involves the detail and strength of the government’s 
justification for the law. Thinking in terms of the traditional tiers of 
scrutiny for constitutional adjudication, one prong of the test is always 
whether the government has a sufficient rationale.111 An election rule that 
opens the political process to more voters or candidates has a positive 
effect: improving democratic participation and legitimacy. Thus, a court 
need not require much more from a government defending a voter-backed 
election law that is democracy-enhancing.112 The court should uphold the 
law if the government can demonstrate the rule’s democracy-enhancing 
purpose or effect (so long as the law does not discriminate or directly 
violate a constitutional precept or state-level mandate). By contrast, a court 
should require a much more detailed and stronger justification for a new 
election rule that restricts voter or candidate access to the democratic 
process. As Professor Eule suggests, courts should take a hard judicial look 
when the majority enacts an initiative that harms minority representation or 
tends to entrench the majority’s power.113 In the language of tiers of 
scrutiny, courts should require the government to show that the new law 
furthers something akin to a compelling interest for rules that are 
democracy-restricting, but something similar to a mere important interest—
which can be the increase in access and participation itself—for laws that 
are democracy-enhancing. 
This rule provides scope and clarity for a court construing a local 
election rule. To be sure, the test does not clear up all of the difficult 
doctrinal questions a court might face when wading into the world of 
election law. But it should help courts analyze new local election rules in a 
way that enhances democratic representation. Perhaps most importantly, 
the test gives broad leeway to local jurisdictions to experiment with local 
election rules that bring more people into the democratic process. Localities 
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should have breathing room to experiment so that the best election rules 
can spread to other areas. 
 In sum, courts should employ light-touch judicial review when 
considering challenges to voter-backed initiatives that expand voter or 
candidate participation in local elections. Courts should provide deference 
to local laws that are democracy-enhancing in that the laws include more 
people in the democratic process. A hard judicial look is warranted only 
when local voter-backed initiatives result in disenfranchisement or 
incumbency protection. In 2016, various local jurisdictions enacted laws 
that increased the size of the electorate or reformed local election rules to 
limit the power or influence of incumbents. Courts should allow local 
jurisdictions to continue these democracy-enhancing experiments. 
CONCLUSION 
Local election law measures on the 2016 ballot probably caught the 
attention of few people outside of the voters who considered them. An 
analysis of the 2016 local initiatives on the rules for voting and elections 
reveals that, in many localities, voters enacted measures that expanded the 
electorate, changed electoral structures to make local elections more 
competitive, and reformed campaign finance rules to help outsider 
candidates. In light of these results, there is likely an opportunity to make 
further changes to election structures and processes through future local 
ballot initiatives. This avenue for change is especially important in the 
current political environment. Republican control of all three branches of 
the federal government and the majority of state governments means that 
federal or state reform designed to expand voter and candidate access is 
unlikely to occur in the near future. Local laws provide a meaningful way 
to improve our election processes. 
Keeping this reality in mind, courts should generally hesitate before 
striking down voter-backed reforms to local elections that enhance 
democratic participation. Courts should trust the wisdom of voters who 
pass local measures that expand the electorate or make it easier to 
challenge incumbent politicians, especially if, in doing so, the current 
voters are reducing their own comparative power. However, courts should 
require governments to provide stronger justifications for laws that result in 
disenfranchisement or incumbency protection because these new rules may 
represent attempts by the majority to keep itself in power and shut others 
out. 
Local rules on voting rights and campaign practices represent a vital 
area of growth for election law moving forward. While courts should defer 
to local election law innovations that are democracy-enhancing, academics 
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and concerned citizens have an important role to play as well. We should 
recognize that local election law reform is significant not only for local 
democracy; it can also influence federal and state policy in future years. 
 
